

























Directed Search with Multiple Job Applications
by
































































































                                      The Bonn Graduate School of  Economics is
                                                             sponsored by theDirected Search









We develop an equilibrium directed search model of the labor mar-
ket where workers can simultaneously apply for multiple jobs. The
main result is that all equilibria exhibit wage dispersion despite the
fact that workers and ﬁrms are homogeneous. Wage dispersion is
driven by the simultaneity of application choice. Risk-neutral workers
apply for both ‘safe’ and ‘risky’ jobs. The former yield a high proba-
bility of a job oﬀer, but for low pay, and act as a fallback option; the
latter provide with higher potential payoﬀ, but are harder to get. Fur-
thermore, the density of posted wages is decreasing, consistent with
stylized facts. Unlike most directed search models, the equilibria are
not constrained eﬃcient.
1 Introduction
“Why are similar workers paid diﬀerently” is a classic question in economics.
In his recent book on the topic, Mortensen points out that “observable worker
∗We would like to thank Ken Burdett, Jan Eeckhout, Georg N¨ oldeke, and Randy Wright
for their help and encouragement. We beneﬁtted from the comments of participants at
the Canadian Economic Theory Conference in Vancouver, the Spring 2005 Midwest Macro
Meetings, the Applied Micro Seminar at the University of Pennsylvania, and the research
seminar at the University of Bonn.
1characteristics that are supposed to account for productivity diﬀerences typ-
ically explain no more than 30 percent of the variation in compensation”
(2003, p.1). Controlling for ﬁrm characteristics helps account for part of the
other 70 percent, but a large residual remains, suggesting that a model with
search frictions might be a useful way to think about this issue.1
Prominent examples of random search models that generate equilibrium
wage dispersion include Burdett and Judd (1983), Albrecht and Axell (1984),
and Burdett and Mortensen (1998). We propose a new model of wage dis-
persion with homogeneous workers and ﬁrms, based not on random but on
directed search, and one additional feature that we think is an important
characteristic of the search process: job seekers can apply for several jobs at
the same time. In random search models, workers looking for employment do
not know the wages oﬀered by diﬀerent ﬁrms. In directed search they observe
the wages posted by all ﬁrms before deciding where to apply. However, they
do not know how many other workers apply to the same ﬁrm and, since ﬁrms
have a limited number of vacancies, they may get rationed. Nevertheless, the
equilibria of these models are usually constrained eﬃcient.2
So far, most research in the area has focused on workers applying for one
job at a time, which results in a unique equilibrium with a single wage (at
least when agents are homogeneous). In this paper, workers apply for N jobs
simultaneously, which yields very diﬀerent results. Despite the assumption of
homogeneity, all equilibria exhibit wage dispersion. Even though workers are
risk neutral, they care about the probability of success of each job application
because their payoﬀs only depend on the most attractive oﬀer they receive.
The resulting portfolio choice problem is the driving force for dispersion.
Furthermore, the density of posted wages is declining, matching well known
stylized facts.3 Last, in our model, equilibria are not constrained eﬃcient.
1Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) estimate a model with observed and unobserved worker
heterogeneity as well as productivity heterogeneity in ﬁrms and conclude that “the con-
tribution of market imperfections to wage dispersion is typically around 50 [percent].” In
a similar exercise, van den Berg and Ridder (1998) report that “search frictions explain
about 20 [percent] of the variation in observable wage oﬀers.”
2One of the reasons why directed search has become more popular is that it provides
with a more explicit explanation of the matching process and wage determination than
random search (Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (in press) discuss this point in their recent
survey of search-theoretic labor models).
3In contrast, the Burdett-Mortensen model delivers a wage density that is upward
slopping. While this can be ﬁxed by extending the framework, it is often said to be a
failing of the basic model (see Mortensen (2003)).
2The intuition behind the main result of dispersion is quite straightfor-
ward. A worker faces a portfolio choice problem when deciding where to send
each of his N applications, since the probability of getting a job is diﬀerent at
diﬀerent wage levels. This occurs because higher paying ﬁrms attract more
applicants on average and hence an application to such a ﬁrm succeeds with
lower probability. Loosely speaking, a worker’s optimal strategy is to apply
to jobs that oﬀer diﬀerent levels of risk and payoﬀ. Some applications are
sent to ‘safe’ wages that guarantee a high probability of getting a job, but
for low pay. Since this provides insurance, it is optimal to take on more risk
with the other applications. As a result, he also applies to ﬁrms where the
probability of getting the job is lower but the potential payoﬀ is high.
The willingness of workers to send each application to a separate wage
level creates an incentive for ﬁrms to post diﬀerent wages. It turns out that
in any equilibrium exactly N wages are posted, and every worker applies once
to each distinct wage. From the ﬁrms’ perspective, the lower margins of high
wages are balanced with a higher probability of ﬁlling a vacancy, leading to
the same expected proﬁts. It is important to reiterate, however, that this
intuition fails in the single application case. It is only because workers apply
multiple times that ﬁrms have the incentive to post diﬀerent wages.
Well-known papers on directed search include Montgomery (1991), Peters
(1991), Shimer (1996), Moen (1997), Julien, Kennes, and King (2000), Bur-
dett, Shi, and Wright (2001), Shi (2002), and Shimer (in press). Delacroix
and Shi (in press) develop a directed search model with on-the-job search,
which shares some features with our model since employed workers can take
on more risk when looking for jobs. Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2005)
is the only other directed search paper where workers apply multiple times
simultaneously. The authors make diﬀerent assumptions and they reach very
diﬀerent results as will be discussed in detail.4 Chade and Smith (2004) solve
a portfolio choice problem that is similar to ours, but in a very diﬀerent par-
tial equilibrium context.
The main insights regarding the strategic tradeoﬀs in our environment
can be developed in a static model with a given number of ﬁrms and a
given number of applications per worker. Section 2 presents the model with
these features, states the main theorem, and proves some straightforward
4The basic diﬀerence is that, in this paper, ﬁrms commit to the wages they post,
while Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2005) assume that ﬁrms making job oﬀers to the
same worker engage in Bertrand competition. See the conclusions for a more detailed
comparison.
3initial results. Section 3 discusses the special case of two applications, which
provides many of the important insights. The following section extends the
results to an arbitrary (ﬁnite) number of applications. Section 5 evaluates the
eﬃciency of the equilibrium and the empirical distribution of wages. Section
6 extends the setup to allow for free entry, endogenous decisions regarding
the number of applications, and a dynamic labor market interaction. Section
7 discusses the diﬀerence of directed vs. random search in terms of wage
distributions. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we introduce the main features of the model, and deﬁne out-
comes, payoﬀs, and equilibrium. At the end we state the main theorem and
prove some preliminary results.
2.1 Environment and Strategies
There are continua of measure b workers and measure 1 ﬁrms with one va-
cancy each. All workers and all ﬁrms are identical, risk neutral, and they
produce one unit when matched and zero otherwise. The matching process
is as follows. Firms start by posting (and committing to) wages. Workers
observe all postings and send out N applications. Firms that receive one or
more applicants make a job oﬀer to one of them. Workers that get one or
more oﬀers choose which job to accept. Therefore, the game can be sepa-
rated in four distinct stages. If a ﬁrm’s chosen applicant rejects the job oﬀer
then the ﬁrm remains unmatched. Firms therefore compete for workers in
two separate stages: they want to attract at least one applicant in the second
stage and they try to keep that applicant in the last stage; we label these
‘ex ante’ and ‘ex post’ competition, respectively. The utility of an employed
worker is equal to his wage and the proﬁts of a ﬁrm that employs a worker
at wage w are given by 1 − w.
As is common in the directed search literature, trading frictions are in-
troduced by focusing attention on symmetric mixed strategies for workers.
The assumption is that, since the market is large, workers cannot coordinate
their search and hence they all use the same strategy. For simplicity, we also
assume that their strategies are anonymous, i.e. all ﬁrms that post the same
wage are treated identically by workers. This assumption, however, is not
4necessary: it is possible to let workers condition on the ﬁrms’ names (say, a
real number in [0,1]) but this would clutter the exposition without changing
the results. Last, the ﬁrms also follow anonymous strategies, meaning that
they treat all workers the same in the event that they receive multiple ap-
plicants. This is the standard environment in the directed search literature,
such as Peters (1991) or Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001), except for the
innocuous assumption of the anonymity of workers’ strategies, and the key
diﬀerence that we allow multiple applications.
Before describing the actual strategies, observe that the last two stages
of the game can be solved immediately. In the fourth stage, workers with
multiple job oﬀers choose the highest wage, and randomize with equal prob-
abilities in the case of a tie. In the third stage, ﬁrms with many applicants
choose one at random. Therefore we only need to consider the strategies for
the ﬁrst two stages. A strategy for the ﬁrm is a wage w that it posts in the
beginning of the game. Workers observe all the wages and decide where to
apply. Denote the distribution of posted wages by F and note that, due to
anonymity, the workers’ strategies can be summarized by the wages to which
the applications are sent. Therefore, a pure strategy for a worker is an N-
tuple of wages to which he applies and a mixed strategy is a randomization
over diﬀerent N-tuples. We denote the workers’ strategy by G(F), which is a
mapping from the posted wages to the set of all cumulative distribution func-
tions on [0,1]N. A worker is not required to send each of his N applications
independently.
2.2 Outcomes and Equilibrium
We deﬁne q(w) to be the probability that a ﬁrm posting w receives at least
one application and ψ(w) to be the conditional probability that a worker who
has applied to such a ﬁrm accepts a diﬀerent job oﬀer (i.e. the probability
that the ﬁrm does not get the worker). Let p(w) be the probability that a
worker applying to wage w gets an oﬀer and W be the support of the posted
wages (i.e., W ≡ suppF). When a wage is not posted by any ﬁrm (w / ∈ W),
we have p(w) = 0. Last, we deﬁne the value of an individual application to
a wage w to be p(w) w. Given any N-tuple w = (w1,w2,...,wN) chosen by
the worker, we assume without loss of generality that wN ≥ wN−1 ≥ ... ≥ w1
for the remainder of the paper.
The expected proﬁts of a ﬁrm that posts w and the expected utility of a
5worker who applies to w are given by
π(w) = q(w) (1 − ψ(w)) (1 − w) (1)




(1 − p(wi)) p(w1) w1 (2)
The expected proﬁts are equal to the probability that at least one appli-
cant appears times the retention probability times (1 − w). A worker gets
utility wN from his highest application, which is successful with probability
p(wN). With the complementary probability that application fails and with
probability p(wN−1) he receives wN−1. And so on.
On W, both p(w) and q(w) depend on the average queue length at w,
which is denoted by λ(w). Intuitively, the queue length is the number of ap-
plications divided by the number of ﬁrms at a particular wage rate. Formally
it is deﬁned by the integral equation
Z w
0
λ(˜ w) dF(˜ w) = b ˆ G(w) (3)
where ˆ G(w) is the expected number of applications that a single worker sends
to wages no greater than w.5 The right hand side of equation (3) gives the
number of applications that are sent up to wage w by all workers, while the
left hand side gives the number of ﬁrms that post up to that wage multiplied
by the average number of applications they receive.
When a worker applies for a wage w he randomizes over all ﬁrms at that
wage rate, due to anonymity. As a result, the number of applications received
by a ﬁrm posting w is random and follows a Poisson distribution with mean
λ(w).6 Therefore the probability that a ﬁrm posting w receives at least one
application is q(w) = 1−e−λ(w) and the probability that a worker who applies
to such a ﬁrm gets an oﬀer is p(w) = (1 − e−λ(w))/λ(w).7
5If Gi(w) is the marginal distribution of wi, then ˆ G(w) =
PN
i=1 Gi(w).
6Suppose that n applications are sent at random to m ﬁrms. The number of applications
received by a ﬁrm follows a binomial distribution with sample size n and probability of
success 1/m. As n,m → ∞ keeping n/m = λ the distribution converges to a Poisson
distribution with mean λ.
7Notice that the anonymity of the worker strategies is not a necessary condition for
this point. Symmetry and optimality clearly imply that ﬁrms with the same wage must
have the same queue length. Poisson matching follows.
6In order to evaluate ψ(w) for some w ∈ W we need to ﬁnd the probability
that, after applying to w, a worker takes a diﬀerent job. Let Rj(wj,w−j) be
the probability that a worker who applies to (wj,w−j) accepts the job posting
wj if made an oﬀer. This occurs if the worker has no oﬀer that is strictly
higher and wj is picked in the case of a tie after randomizing. The indexes
of applications can be relabeled so that higher indexes are given preference
when tied. This means that Rj(wj,w−j) =
Q
k>j(1 − p(wk)) and we can
integrate over all possible wages where workers apply to.8 Letting Pr[j|w]
be the conditional probability that a worker who applied to w ∈ W did so
with his jth application and Gj(w−j|w) be the conditional distribution over
the other applications, given that the jth application was sent to wage w,
ψ(w) is given by






So far λ(w) and ψ(w) have been deﬁned for wages on the support of F,
meaning that the workers’ optimization problem can be solved for a given
distribution of posted wages. However, oﬀ the equilibrium path payoﬀs need
to be evaluated in order to solve the ﬁrms’ problem, and this requires that
λ(w) and ψ(w) are well deﬁned on the full domain [0,1]. That is, a ﬁrm
needs to know the queue length and the retention probability it will face at
any wage. Therefore, although no one is actually applying to wages that
are not posted, the queue lengths at such wages could be positive since they
represent how many workers would apply there if these wage were oﬀered;
and similarly for ψ(w). The problem is that when w / ∈ W, λ(w) and ψ(w)
are not pinned down by equations (3) and (4), as both F and G have zero
density at those wages.
To get around this problem we deﬁne λ and ψ as if ‘many’ ﬁrms post every
wage in [0,1] so that the reaction of workers can be meaningfully evaluated.
We introduce a fraction of noise ﬁrms of measure epsilon that post a wage at
random from a full support distribution, ˜ F. Equivalently, one can interpret
it as a mistake that ﬁrms make with probability . Given a candidate F,
the distribution of posted wages becomes F(w) = (1 − ) F(w) +  ˜ F(w)
and the game can be analyzed from the second stage onwards. Workers
8The relabeling is without loss of generality since the randomization can occur before
the applications are actually sent.
7observe F and their best response is G(F). The outcomes λ and ψ can
be calculated in the entire domain [0,1] using F, G(F), and equations (3)
and (4). As  → 0 the perturbed distribution converges to F, and we deﬁne
λ(w) = lim→0 λ(w) and ψ(w) = lim→0 ψ(w) for all w ∈ [0,1]. Noise
ﬁrms are simply a means to evaluate the proﬁts a ﬁrm would obtain when
deviating, and none of our results depend on the exact choice of ˜ F.9
We can now deﬁne an equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 2.1 Given a distribution with full support ˜ F, an equilibrium is
a set of strategies {F,G} such that
1. π(w) ≥ π(w0) for all w ∈ W and w0 ∈ [0,1].
2. U(w) ≥ U(w0) for all w ∈ suppG(F) and w0 ∈ [0,1]N.
The ﬁrst condition captures the proﬁt maximization by ﬁrms and the second
one ensures that workers best respond.
We now state the main theorem of this paper.
Theorem 2.1 An equilibrium always exists and it is unique when N = 2. N
diﬀerent wages are posted by ﬁrms and every worker sends one application to
each distinct wage. The number of ﬁrms that post a given wage is decreasing
with the wage. The equilibria are not constrained eﬃcient.
2.3 Preliminary Results
The next lemma will be useful in the following sections. Let w be the lowest
posted wage that receives some applications with positive probability, i.e.
w = inf{w ∈ W|λ(w) > 0}.
9Two diﬀerent approaches have been taken to solve the same problem in the N = 1 case.
The market utility approach, used in Shimer (1996, 2004), Moen (1997), Acemo˘ glu and
Shimer (1999), posits that workers respond to deviations by ﬁrms so as to be indiﬀerent
between applying anywhere. In our framework this approach yields identical result, but it
is less appealing due to the complexity of specifying indiﬀerences over sets of wages. Peters
(2000) and Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001), on the other hand, solve for the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of the ﬁnite model and then take the limit of that equilibrium
as the number of agents goes to inﬁnity. While arguably the correct (or most reasonable)
approach, with multiple applications this is intractable because the probability of success
of each application is correlated (see Albrecht, Gautier, Tan, and Vroman (2004)).
8Lemma 2.1 Given any distribution of posted wages, worker optimization
implies that λ(w) is continuous and strictly increasing on (w,1] ∩ W.
Proof: Recall that the probability of getting a job is given by p(w) =
(1 − e−λ(w))/λ(w) for w ∈ W. If λ(w) is not strictly increasing there exist
w,w0 ∈ W such that w > w0 and p(w) ≥ p(w0). When λ(w0) > 0, a worker
who applies to that ﬁrm with positive probability can proﬁtably deviate by
switching to w since the wage is higher and the probability of getting an oﬀer
is at least as high. Therefore λ(w) is strictly increasing above any posted
wage that has a positive expected queue length, and hence on (w,1] ∩ W.
Suppose that λ(w) is not continuous on [w,1] ∩ W. Then there is a ˆ w ∈ W
such that for w ∈ W arbitrarily close to ˆ w it holds that |λ(ˆ w) − λ(w)| > k
for a given k > 0. Therefore the probability of getting a job oﬀer is discon-
tinuous at ˆ w and a worker applying in a neighborhood of ˆ w has an obvious
proﬁtable deviation. QED
The properties described in the lemma are very natural. The expected
number of applicants increases with the wage that a ﬁrm posts, which also
implies that the probability of getting an oﬀer for that job is strictly decreas-
ing. λ(w) is continuous because the workers’ best response to the oﬀered
wages ‘smooths out’ any discontinuities of F: even if a positive measure of
ﬁrms post a particular wage, the workers respond by sending a positive mea-
sure of their applications to that wage so that the queue length does not
jump. It is important to note that the derived results hold for any perturba-
tion and therefore they hold in the full [0,1] range of the unperturbed game.
Moreover, any distribution with full support leads to monotonicity and con-
tinuity which are the main points of the lemma. As a result, the particular
choice of ˜ F does not make a diﬀerence.
3 A Special Case: N = 2
We look at the special case where workers send only two applications which
provides many of the main insights. The case of a general N is discussed
in the next section. We start by solving for the best response of workers
given an arbitrary distribution of posted wages. We then characterize the
wages that ﬁrms post. Finally, the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
is proved.
93.1 Worker Optimization
We ﬁrst ﬁnd the best response of workers for an arbitrary distribution of
posted wages. The posted distribution could be the result of a perturbation
but in that case the subscript  is omitted to keep notation simple. When
a worker decides where to apply he faces a menu of wage and probability
pairs from which to choose. The queue length, and hence the probability
of success, is determined by the distribution of posted wages, F, and the
strategy that other workers use to apply for jobs, G(F). Recalling that
w2 ≥ w1 by convention, the worker solves
max
(w2,w1)∈[0,1]2 p(w2) w2 + (1 − p(w2)) p(w1) w1 (5)
Diﬀerentiability of p(w) is not guaranteed so the problem cannot be solved
by taking the ﬁrst order conditions. We show that each application can be
evaluated separately, even though this is still a simultaneous choice problem.
That is, the problem admits a convenient recursive solution.
The low wage application is exercised only if w2 fails, which means that




Let u1 denote this maximum value. Given that a worker sends his low wage
application to a particular w1 that solves (6), his optimal choice for the high
wage application is a solution to
max
w≥w1
p(w) w + (1 − p(w)) u1 (7)
Let u2 denote the highest utility a worker can receive from two applications.
An implication of worker optimization is that all low wage applications oﬀer
the same value u1, and all pairs of wages where workers apply give the same
total utility u2.10
The next step is to show that the two problems can actually be solved
independently of each other. Let ¯ w be the highest wage that oﬀers u1, i.e.
¯ w = max{w ∈ W|p(w) w = u1}.11 The ﬁrst proposition follows.
10It is not hard to see that a pair of wages is a solution to (5) if and only if it solves (6)
and (7).
11The maximum is well deﬁned since λ(w) is continuous and W is a closed set.
10Proposition 3.1 Given any distribution of posted wages, workers optimize
only if w1 ≤ ¯ w ≤ w2 holds for every pair (w1,w2) where they apply.
Proof: Suppose this is not true. Since w1 ≤ w2 the only other possibilities
are ¯ w < w1 or w2 < ¯ w. By construction w1 > ¯ w implies that p(w1) w1 < u1
which cannot be optimal. If w2 < ¯ w then a worker can deviate and send
his high wage application to ¯ w instead of w2. This deviation is proﬁtable
because
p(¯ w) ¯ w + (1 − p(¯ w)) p(w1) w1 − [p(w2) w2 + (1 − p(w2)) p(w1) w1] =
(p(¯ w) ¯ w − p(w2) w2) + [p(w2) − p(¯ w)] p(w1) w1 > 0
The ﬁrst term is non-negative since ¯ w provides the highest possible value by
deﬁnition. The second term is strictly positive because ¯ w > w2 ⇒ p(¯ w) <
p(w2). QED
This result has several implications. The workers are indiﬀerent about
which combination of wages they apply to so long as they are on opposite
sides of ¯ w. All wages below ¯ w oﬀer the same value, u1, since every worker
sends his low application there; similarly, all wages above ¯ w oﬀer u2 when
paired with a low wage. These results hold for any perturbed distribution
of wages and hence they hold in the limit as  → 0. Recalling that λ(w)
is strictly increasing in w and that p(w) = (1 − e−λ(w))/λ(w), the following
conditions uniquely deﬁne the queue length:
p(w) w = u1, ∀ w ∈ [u1, ¯ w] (8)
p(w) w + (1 − p(w)) u1 = u2, ∀ w ∈ [¯ w,1] (9)
Wages below u1 are not relevant because the value of these openings is too
low. Even if applicants receive an oﬀer with probability one they would not
apply to such a wage.
These observations are illustrated in ﬁgure (1). The high indiﬀerence
curve (IC-H) traces the wage and queue length pairs where workers are willing
to send a high wage application, while IC-L is the indiﬀerence curve for the
low wage applications. The two curves intersect at ¯ w where workers are
indiﬀerent about whether they apply with a ‘high’ or a ‘low’ application.
Finally, a wage above ¯ w attracts a high wage application. This means that
the queue length is ‘bid up’ to IC-H and similarly for wages below the cutoﬀ.







IC-H: p(w) w+ (1-p(w)) u1 = u2
IC-L: p(w) w = u1
Figure 1: Workers’ application behavior.
It is interesting to note that while the total utility of any pair of wages is
always equal to u2, wages that are strictly above ¯ w give value that is stricly
lower than u1 and workers nevertheless apply there. This is illustrated in
ﬁgure (1) by the fact that IC-H provides with greater utility than IC-L in
the high wages. This point appears to be counterintuitive at ﬁrst sight: if
workers can apply to wages that oﬀer value u1, why would they choose some
wage with a strictly lower individual value? The answer is that the return to
failure in the high wage application is not zero: it is equal to the value that
the next application brings in. As a result, when the worker chooses where
to send his high wage application he faces a tradeoﬀ between the value that
he can get from that particular application and the probability of exercising
his fallback option, i.e. the low wage application. Since the low wage pro-
vides with insurance against the possible failure of w2, it is proﬁtable for the
worker to try a risky application that has high returns conditional on success
(i.e., the wage is high) and also oﬀers a high chance of continuing to the
next application. Therefore, the low wage application goes to a relatively
‘safe’ region and the high application is sent to a ‘risky’ part of the wage
distribution.12
12This is an important diﬀerence between our paper and other papers on directed search
with wage dispersion in which the value of sending an application is always the same for
identical workers. This is solely due to the fact that the same worker applies multiple
times and hence he faces a portfolio choice problem.
12The next result proves that any equilibrium exhibits wage dispersion.
Proposition 3.2 There does not exist an equilibrium in which only one wage
is posted.
Proof: See the appendix. QED
The main intuition of the proof is straightforward. When a single wage is
posted, workers are indiﬀerent about which ﬁrm to work for and hence they
randomize when they get multiple job oﬀers. However, if a ﬁrm deviates
and posts a slightly higher wage, it wins the worker for sure even when he
receives other oﬀers. Since the increase in the hiring probability is discrete,
while the increase in the wage can be arbitrarily small, this deviation raises
proﬁts. Note that it is the ex post competition among ﬁrms that precludes
the possibility of a single wage equilibrium.
3.2 Characterization of Firm Optimization
We now turn to the analysis of the ﬁrst stage of the model. We prove that
exactly two wages are posted in equilibrium and we characterize them.
When posting a wage, ﬁrms solve
max
w∈[0,1]
q(w) (1 − ψ(w)) (1 − w) (10)
taking the equilibrium objects { ¯ w,u1,u2} as given. The probability that
a ﬁrm receives at least one applicant, q(w), depends on the average queue
length according to q(w) = 1−e−λ(w). Whether a wage is above or below the
cutoﬀ ¯ w determines the type of application it receives (high or low). This
helps evaluate the probability of losing a worker after making an oﬀer, ψ(w).
We label the ﬁrms that attract high (low) wage applications as high (low)
wage ﬁrms. The next proposition states the result of the maximization which
is proved in the appendix. A discussion follows to provide intuition about
the main points.
Proposition 3.3 In equilibrium, all high wage ﬁrms post ¯ w and all low wage
ﬁrms post ˆ w1 ∈ (u1, ¯ w) which is derived by the ﬁrst order conditions.
Proof: See the appendix. QED
13The reason why one wage is posted by each type of ﬁrms is not surprising:
conditional on attracting a particular type of applications, ﬁrms compete
with each other in the same way as in the one application case (e.g. Burdett,
Shi, and Wright (2001)), subject to some additional boundary conditions.
As a result there is a unique solution to each of their proﬁt maximization
problems and two distinct wages are posted, (w∗
1,w∗
2).
To examine this in some more detail note that high wage ﬁrms are the
applicants’ best alternative and hence workers never reject an oﬀer by such a





−λ(w)] (1 − w) (11)
s.t. p(w) w + (1 − p(w)) u1 = u2 (12)
When proﬁts are equalized across ﬁrms, the point of tangency between the
isoproﬁt curve of the high wage ﬁrms and the high indiﬀerence curve of
workers, ˆ w2, always occurs at a wage which is below ¯ w, as illustrated in
ﬁgure 2. This means that in any equilibrium the high wage ﬁrms have to
post at their lower boundary and w∗
2 = ¯ w.
The retention probability of low wage ﬁrms can now be calculated. When
a low wage ﬁrm makes a job oﬀer, it loses its applicant only if he is successful
in his high wage application which occurs with probability p(¯ w). As a result,




−λ(w)] [1 − p(¯ w)] (1 − w) (13)
s.t. p(w) w = u1 (14)
Since the retention probability enters the maximization problem as a con-
stant, it has no marginal eﬀect on the choice of low wage ﬁrms. Proposition
(3.2) ensures that in equilibrium low wage ﬁrms cannot be posting at the
boundary. As a result their proﬁt maximizing wage occurs at the point of
tangency between their isoproﬁt curve and the low indiﬀerence curve of work-
ers, i.e. w∗
1 = ˆ w1. Last, note that the proﬁt functions are diﬀerent for the two
types of ﬁrms which is why proﬁts are equal even though the two isoproﬁt
curves do not intersect in ﬁgure 2.
It is now easy to see that the density of posted wages is falling. Each wage
receives one application per worker so λ(w∗










Figure 2: Firms’ equilibrium behavior.
of ﬁrms posting w∗
i. d1 > d2 follows from the fact that the queue length is
increasing with the wage rate. This result is driven by the fact that workers
‘want’ their high wage application to be risky (or, the queue length to be
high). If this is not the case, a worker would be better oﬀ by not applying
to the low wage and instead sending both applications to the high wage.
3.3 Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
Turning to the existence of equilibrium, we need to ﬁnd the ‘correct’ fraction
of ﬁrms to post each wage so that proﬁts are equalized across types of ﬁrms.
More formally, an equilibrium exists if there is {d1,d2} such that d1 +d2 = 1
and there is no proﬁtable deviation when w∗
i is posted by di ﬁrms. Fur-
thermore, the equilibrium is unique when there is a single pair of di’s that
satisﬁes the two conditions above.
Proposition 3.4 An equilibrium exists and it is unique.
Proof: See the appendix. QED
At this point it should be remarked that the full support of ˜ F is the only
property of the trembling distribution that is used in solving the model. As
a result, the unique equilibrium that was constructed survives any choice of
˜ F.
154 The General Case: N ≥ 2
We turn to the model with a general N. The analysis mirrors the one of
section 3 and we prove that all results generalize, except for uniqueness.
We provide computational evidence for uniqueness at the end of the section.
Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of posted and received wages for an econ-
omy with equal number of workers and ﬁrms and N = 15. Properties of the
distribution of received wages are discussed in the next section.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium wage dispersion for N = 15 and b = 1.
4.1 Worker Optimization
Let Wi be the support of wi for all i, i.e. Wi is the set of wages that
receive the ith application of workers. As before, the utility of the lowest i
applications has to be the same in any N-tuple of wages which deﬁnes the
following recursive relationship
ui = p(wi) wi + (1 − p(wi)) ui−1, ∀ wi ∈ Wi, i ∈ {1,2,...N} (15)
where u0 ≡ 0. Note that ui > ui−1 since wi ≥ wi−1. Moreover, ui is the
highest possible utility a worker can get from i applications when his fallback
option is ui−1. Let ¯ wi be the highest wage that provides with total utility
equal to ui when the fallback option is ui−1, i.e ¯ wi = sup{w|p(w) w + (1 −
16p(w)) ui−1 = ui}. Also, let ¯ w0 be the lowest wage that receives applications
with positive probability. We now generalize proposition (3.1).
Proposition 4.1 When workers optimally send N applications, w ∈ Wi ⇒
w ∈ [¯ wi−1, ¯ wi] for i ∈ {1,2,...N}.
Proof: The proof is by induction. It is suﬃcient to show that the following
property holds for all i: w < ¯ wi ⇒ w / ∈ Wk for k ≥ i + 1. The initial step
for i = 1 was proved in the previous section, where ¯ w1 = ¯ w. We assume that
the property holds for i − 1 and show that a contradiction is reached if it
does not hold for i. In other words, if w < ¯ wi−1 ⇒ w ∈ Wi−1 holds, then
there is no ˜ w ∈ Wi+1 such that ˜ w < ¯ wi (if ˜ w ∈ Wk for k > i + 1 the same
argument goes through). Deﬁne v(w,ui−1) = p(w) w + (1 − p(w)) ui−1 to
be the utility of applying to a particular wage w when the fallback option is
ui−1. We want to show that v(¯ wi,ui) > v(˜ w,ui) for all ˜ w < ¯ wi. Note that
v(˜ w,ui−1) = p(˜ w) ˜ w + (1 − p(˜ w)) ui−1 ≤
v(¯ wi,ui−1) = p(¯ wi) ¯ wi + (1 − p(¯ wi)) ui−1
since the second line is the optimal choice when ui−1 is the fallback option
and hence it provides with the maximum level of utility. Replacing ui−1 with
ui in both lines above we get the terms to be compared. Since ¯ wi > ˜ w ⇒
(1−p(¯ wi)) > (1−p(˜ w)) the second term increases by more and the inequality
becomes strict which proves the result. QED
An implication of the proposition is that when a worker applies to a ﬁrm
of type i he receives the posted wage w if he is successful in his application
or ui−1 if he is unsuccessful. Therefore the queue lengths facing the ﬁrms
attracting the ith application are given by the following equation:
p(w) w + (1 − p(w)) ui−1 = ui, ∀ w ∈ [¯ wi−1, ¯ wi] (16)
which is a straight generalization of equations (8) and (9).
4.2 Firm Optimization
We now turn to the ﬁrst stage of the model. For the remainder of the paper
ﬁrms that receive the ith lowest application of workers are referred to as
type i firms. The proﬁt maximization problem of each type of ﬁrm is solved
and proﬁts are then equalized across types.
17When posting a wage, ﬁrms take as given the cutoﬀs { ¯ wk}N
k=0 and the
equilibrium utility levels {uk}N
k=1, which determine the utility provided to
workers for their lowest k applications. A ﬁrm of type i solves the following
proﬁt maximization problem:
max
w∈[ ¯ wi−1, ¯ wi]
q(w) (1 − ψ(w)) (1 − w) (17)
where the queue lengths are determined by equations (16).
Proposition 4.2 In equilibrium, all type i ﬁrms post the same wage w∗
i =
¯ wi−1 for i ≥ 2. The lowest type of ﬁrms all post ˆ w1 which it is determined
by the ﬁrst order conditions.
Proof: See the appendix. QED
The logic of the proof is similar to the one of proposition (3.3). The
solution to the problem of type N ﬁrms is shown to be ¯ wN−1. This means
that ψ(w) = p(¯ wN−1) for type N − 1 ﬁrms and the solution to their proﬁt
maximizing problem is ¯ wN−2. This implies that ψ(w) = (1 − p(¯ wN−1)) (1 −
p(¯ wN−2)) for type N−3 ﬁrms and so on. In general, the retention probability
of a type i ﬁrms is 1 − ψ(w) =
QN
n=i+1(1 − p(w∗
n)) ≡ 1 − ψi. Given ψi, the
maximization problem for a type i ﬁrm becomes
max
w∈[ ¯ wi−1, ¯ wi]
q(w) (1 − w) (1 − ψi) (18)
s.t. p(w) w + (1 − p(w)) ui−1 = ui (19)
and the solution lies at the lower boundary for all i ≥ 2. Finally, it should
be noted that the density of posted wages is falling for the same reasons as
in section 3.
4.3 Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
The next proposition proves the existence of an equilibrium. We then provide
some suﬃcient conditions for uniqueness and show computationally that they
are plausible.
Proposition 4.3 An equilibrium exists for any N.
18Proof: See the appendix. QED
In the appendix we show that given an arbitrary number of type one ﬁrms,
d1, we can ﬁnd a unique sequence d2(d1),d3(d1)...dN(d1) such that all types
of ﬁrms make the same proﬁts when w∗
i is posted by di ﬁrms. Furthermore,
there is some d0
1 such that S(d0
1) = 1 where S(d1) ≡ d1 +
PN
i=2 di(d1). The
uniqueness of an equilibrium has not been proved analytically for a general





We now ﬁx N and derive some suﬃcient conditions for uniqueness. Let
Sb(d1) denote the sum of the dis when the number of ﬁrms posting w∗
1 is d1,
the worker-ﬁrm ratio is b, and all ﬁrms make the same proﬁts. Also, let D(b)
be the set of all N-tuples where Sb(d1) = 1. The following lemma describes
the result.



















Figure 4: Sum of ﬁrms for b = 1 and various N.
Lemma 4.1 Given N, the equilibrium is unique for any b > 0 if Sb∗(d1) is
strictly increasing for some b∗.
Proof: Given any b and b0 let d0








D(b0). Furthermore, the equilibrium conditions are fulﬁlled in one case if
and only if they are fulﬁlled in the other. If Sb∗(d1) is strictly increasing for
some b∗, then there is a unique d∗
1 such that Sb∗(d∗
1) = 1 and hence there is
19a unique equilibrium. This means that the equilibrium is unique for any b.
QED
Figure 4 graphs Sb(d1) when b = 1 for various N. Graphs for other N
look similar, which suggests that the equilibrium is unique.
5 Further Equilibrium Properties
In this section we investigate the eﬃciency properties of the matching process
and the empirical distribution implied by the model.
5.1 Eﬃciency
The criterion for constrained eﬃciency is whether the output (or, the number
of matches) is maximized conditional on the matching frictions, given the
worker-ﬁrm ration b. The main result is that eﬃciency does not obtain, since
workers send too many applications to high wage ﬁrms.
It was shown in the earlier sections that in equilibrium workers send each
of their N applications to a diﬀerent group of ﬁrms, which was identiﬁed
by its distinct wage. Since wages are irrelevant for eﬃciency purposes we
label the ﬁrms posting wi as group i. As before, pi = p(wi) and λi =
λ(wi) = b/di. Letting d = (d1,d2,...,dN) be the vector of the fraction of
ﬁrms within each group, the total number of matches is given by b m(d)
where m(d) ≡ 1 −
QN
i=1 (1 − pi) is the probability that a particular worker
receives a job oﬀer. The planner has to decide how many ﬁrms to allocate to
each group in order to maximize output or, equivalently, to maximize m(d).
An immediate necessary condition for optimality (which fails) is that the
probability of a match cannot be increased by reallocating ﬁrms between
any two groups. This condition follows directly from observing that m(d) =
1 − (1 − pk) (1 − pl)
Q
i6=k,l (1 − pi), given any two groups of ﬁrms, k and l.
Therefore, an equilibrium is eﬃcient only if dk and dl minimize (1−pk) (1−pl),
which is the same as solving
max
dk,dl≥0
(pk + pl − pk pl) (20)




This problem is identical to the case of two applications where the worker-
ﬁrm ratio is given by b/(1 −
P
i6=k,l di). Therefore, we consider the N = 2
20case for an arbitrary b, letting d be the fraction of ﬁrms in the ﬁrst group
and 1 − d the fraction in the second group. The planner has to decide the
optimal value of d.
Proposition 5.1 When N = 2 the number of matches is maximized only if
d = 1/2 or d ∈ {0,1}.
Proof: See the appendix. QED
The proposition shows that the number of ﬁrms should be equal in both
groups when it is optimal to send two applications. Note, however, that it
may be optimal to send only one application due to congestion. As a result,
all non-degenerate groups should also have equal size when N applications
are sent. However, we know that in equilibrium the number of ﬁrms posting
the lower wages is larger and hence this eﬃciency condition is never met.
This fundamental lack of eﬃciency arises because workers apply to a port-
folio of wages and hence they are willing to accept higher queue lengths at
higher wages. As this eﬀect is not driven by any productivity diﬀerentials, it
leads to ineﬃciencies. Moreover, since the lack of eﬃciency arises from the
matching process it carries over even if the number of applications is endo-
genized or if the ratio of workers to ﬁrms is determined according to a zero
proﬁt condition. It is worthwhile to mention that in the usual directed search
environment with one application eﬃciency does obtain: ﬁrst, the matching
process is constrained eﬃcient by default; furthermore, entry is eﬃcient and,
in the case of agent heterogeneity, there is wage dispersion which leads to an
eﬃcient allocation of labor across ﬁrms (see Mortensen and Wright (2002)
for a discussion).
5.2 The Empirical Distribution
As already noted, the density of posted wages is decreasing. Since higher
wages are accepted more often, however, the density of received wages need
not be decreasing. We ﬁnd that a suﬃcient condition for the empirical density
to be declining is that the worker-ﬁrm ratio, b, is large enough. The density
may be non-monotonic for intermediate values of b and is increasing for very
small b.
The measure of workers who are employed at wage w∗
i is given by b (1 −
ψi+1) pi ≡ Ei. Moreover, Ei−1 = b (1 − ψi) pi−1 = b (1 − ψi+1) (1 − pi) pi−1.
21For the density to be declining, Ei < Ei−1 has to hold for all i which happens
if and only if pi < (1 − pi) pi−1. Equal proﬁts imply that q(w∗




i−1) or pi λi (1−w∗
i) = pi−1 λi−1 (1−pi) (1−w∗
i−1) yielding
the condition λi (1−w∗
i) > λi−1 (1−w∗
i−1). Using the equilibrium conditions
w∗
i = (ui−1−ui−2)/pi+ui−1 and w∗
i−1 = (ui−1−ui−2)/pi−1+ui−1 the inequality
becomes λi(1−x/pi) > λi−1(1−x/pi−1) where x ≡ (ui−1 −ui−2)/(1−ui−2).
Therefore, the empirical distribution is decreasing if g(λ) ≡ λ (1 − λ x/(1 −
e−λ)) is increasing with respect to the queue length. The ﬁrst derivative
yields ∂g/∂λ = (1−e−λ) (1−e−λ−2 λ x)+λ2 x e−λ which is positive if λ x
is small. Noting that λi x = (1 − e−λi) (w∗
i − ui−2)/(1 − ui−2) and that the
right hand side goes to zero for b large enough the result is established.
6 Extensions
The main insights concerning the strategic interaction were developed in a
static model for a given number of ﬁrms and a given number of applications
per worker. The main conclusions carry over when we allow for free entry,
for endogenous decisions concerning the number of applications, and for a
dynamic labor market interaction. This section discusses each case in turn.
6.1 Free Entry
Consider a large number of potential ﬁrms, each of which can pay a ﬁxed
cost K < 1 to enter the labor market. The measure of workers is normalized
to 1. Take the number N of applications as given. It is easy to see that
limb→∞ π(wi) = 1 and limb→0 π(wi) = 0 for all i. As proﬁts are a continuous
function of b there is some b∗ > 0 such that the equilibrium proﬁts are
exactly equal to K.13 For N = 2 we can establish that equilibrium proﬁts
strictly increase in the ratio of workers to ﬁrms, and therefore the free entry
equilibrium is unique.
13This is immediate for N = 2 as the equilibrium for a given b is unique and equilibrium
proﬁts are continuous in b. While we argued that uniqueness prevails more generally,
lemma 9.1 in the appendix establishes the appropriate version of the intermediate value
theorem in the presence of a non-degenerate equilibrium correspondence.
226.2 Endogenous Number of Applications
We introduce a cost per application c and endogenize the number of appli-
cations that a worker sends. As earlier, attention is restricted to symmetric
equilibria where every worker sends the same number of applications in ex-
pectation. Two separate issues are investigated. It is shown that there is a
non-trivial range of the cost parameter that supports the equilibria described
in the previous sections. We then discuss the equilibria that can arise for an
arbitrary value of c.
To analyze the ﬁrst issue, recall that ui is the maximum payoﬀ a worker
receives when applying i times. To determine the marginal beneﬁt of the ith
application note that in equilibrium for i ≥ 2
ui = pi w
∗
i + (1 − pi) ui−1 (21)
ui−1 = pi w
∗
i + (1 − pi) ui−2 (22)
where the ﬁrst expression holds by the deﬁnition of ui and the second holds
because w∗
i = ¯ wi−1. Subtracting (22) from (21), the marginal beneﬁt of the
ith application is given by ui−ui−1 = (1−pi) (ui−1−ui−2) =
Qi
j=2(1−pj) u1.
Clearly, the marginal beneﬁt of an additional application is decreasing in i
and as a result uN −uN−1 > c is a suﬃcient condition for workers to send at
least N applications. Moreover, since the left hand side is strictly positive,
the equilibrium is robust to the introduction of small costs of search.14
The next step is to ensure that no worker applies more than N times. It
is easy to see that a worker who contemplates sending N + 1 applications
will send his additional application to the highest wage, w∗
N. His utility from
applying N+1 times is therefore given by uN+1 = pN w∗
N+(1−pN) uN which
means that the marginal beneﬁt of the ‘extra’ application is uN+1 − uN =
(1 − pN) (uN − uN−1). As a result, an equilibrium where workers apply
exactly N times can be supported when the cost parameter lies in the open
set ((1 − pN) (uN − uN−1),uN − uN−1).
Turning to the case of determining N for an arbitrary c, let the superscript
n denote the equilibrium outcomes that arise when workers send n applica-
tions. It is possible that c < (1−pN
N) (uN
N −uN





simultaneously. The ﬁrst inequality means that a worker has an incentive
to apply N + 1 times, when everyone else sends N applications, while the
14This is not the case in other models, e.g. Albrecht and Axell (1984); see Gaumont,
Schindler, and Wright (2005) for a discussion.
23second inequality implies that applying N times is preferable when everyone
applies N + 1 times. As a result, an equilibrium in the (now endogenous)
number of applications has to involve some randomization in the number of
applications: proportion α ∈ (0,1) of workers apply N +1 times while 1−α
apply N times, where α is chosen so that both types of workers receive the
same ex ante utility.15 It is worth noting that an equilibrium where workers
randomize over how many times to apply looks very much like the one we
have already developed. Some ﬁrms will post a wage, w∗
N+1, which is visited
only by workers who send N +1 applications. The maximization problem of
that group can be solved in a similar way to the previous sections, though
characterization may be slightly diﬀerent as it is possible that w∗
N+1 is not
constrained. Numerical simulations suggest that any possible possible cost
per application can be supported by such an equilibrium. However, there
may be multiplicity of equilibria.
6.3 The Dynamic Version
The static model can be generalized to an inﬁnite horizon dynamic setting in
a straightforward way. We will show that in any steady-state the structure of
the interaction is essentially unchanged. As a result there will still be exactly
N wages oﬀered, fewer ﬁrms post higher wages, and high wage ﬁrms are still
downward constraint.
The results of the static model presented in the previous sections extend to
an inﬁnite horizon dynamic setting in a straightforward way. In this section
we develop such a dynamic labor market and show that in any steady-state
the structure of the interaction is essentially unchanged compared to the
static model. As a result there will still be exactly N wages oﬀered, fewer
ﬁrms post higher wages, and high wage ﬁrms are still downward constraint.
The labor market opens every period with ﬁrms posting wages and work-
ers sending N applications. Vacancies are ﬁlled in the same way as in the
static model and the agents who get matched leave the market and produce.
As before, ﬁrms cannot recall the applicants that they previously rejected.
Before a period begins, matches formed earlier are dissolved with exogenous
probability δ and in that case the agents reenter the market. In jobs that
survive the surplus is split according to the wage with which the match was
15It is relatively straightforward to show that the number of applications that workers
send in equilibrium can only be one apart. This is due to the decreasing returns of
additional applications.
24consummated. The agents have a common discount factor β. There is a
cost K of posting a vacancy for one period, so the number of ﬁrms in the
market is determined according to a zero proﬁt condition. We are interested
in stationary equilibria.16
First, let W(w) be the value to a worker of being employed at wage w and
let L be the value of being unemployed. Furthermore, let J(w) be the value
to a ﬁrm of employing a worker at w and let V be the value of a vacancy.
When V ≥ 0 ﬁrms are wiling to post vacancies and the Bellman equations
are given by
W(w) = w + β [(1 − δ) W(w) + δ L] ⇒ W(w) =
w + β δ L
1 − β (1 − δ)
(23)
J(w) = 1 − w + β [(1 − δ) J(w) + δ V ] ⇒ J(w) =
1 − w + β δ V
1 − β (1 − δ)
(24)
To determine L and V we need to consider the optimization problem facing
the agents if they enter the period unmatched. Suppose that at the steady-
state equilibrium ratio of searching workers to posting ﬁrms is b. The problem
that the agents face is similar to the static case, except for the fact that if
they do not match they can try again in the following period. As a result











(1 − p(wi)) βL
V (w) = q(w) (1 − ψ(w)) J(w) + [1 − q(w) (1 − ψ(w))] V − K
where the optimal continuation values L and V are deﬁned by the functional
equations L = supw∈[0,1]N L(w) and V = supw∈[0,1] V (w).17 Inserting (23)
16We are considering stationary equilibria with restrictions of anonymity and symmetry
as in the one-shot model, where ﬁrms and workers expect to face the steady-state equi-
librium distribution in all future periods and condition their actions only on their current
employment situation and the current period wages.
17Workers can wait to the next period if wages are too low. To introduce this, simply




1 − β(1 − δ)
+ ... +
QN
i=2(1 − p(wi)) p(w1) w1




1 − β(1 − δ)
β(1 − β)(1 − δ)L +
βδ
1 − β(1 − δ)
L (25)
V (w) =
q(w) (1 − ψ(w))
1 − β (1 − δ)
(1 − w) + [1 − q(w) (1 − ψ(w))] V − K(26)
The principle of optimality requires that agents current period choices max-
imize (25) respectively (26), taking the optimal continuation values L and V
as given. Noting that 1
1−β(1−δ) is only a multiplier in the maximization prob-
lem, that the last term in the workers’ and ﬁrms’ problem is only a constant,
and that V for ﬁrms equals zero due to free entry, workers maximize
p(wN) wN + ... +
N Y
i=2
(1 − p(wi)) p(w1) w1 + β(1 − β)(1 − δ)
N Y
i=1
(1 − p(wi)) L,
and ﬁrms maximize
q(w) (1 − ψ(w)) (1 − w).
These correspond the proﬁt and utility speciﬁcations (1) and (2) in the one-
shot model, only that the workers have a strictly positive fallback option
u0 ≡ β(1−β)(1−δ)L. As a main insight of this section, we obtain the same
qualitative results as in the one-shot model:
Proposition 6.1 In a stationary equilibrium of the dynamic labor market
with steady-state values b and L, all type i ﬁrms post w∗
i = ¯ wi−1 for i ≥ 2.
The wage of the lowest type of ﬁrms is given by the ﬁrst order conditions.
The wages are derived as in the one-shot model, appropriately modiﬁed to
accommodate u0 = β(1 − β)(1 − δ)L > 0.
Proof: This proof mirrors the one of proposition (3.1) and (4.2), so it is
omitted.
We obtained the result for some steady-state value of L and some steady-
state measure S of searching workers and M of wage-posting ﬁrms, such that
26b = S
M. To derive the equilibrium, we have to take the transition dynamics
into account. Let Et, St, and Mt denote the number of employed workers (or
ﬁrms), searching workers, and vacant ﬁrms respectively, at time t. Also, let
P(bt) be the probability that a worker ﬁnds a job when the worker-ﬁrm ratio
is bt = St
Mt; similarly, the probability that a ﬁrm hires a worker is bt P(bt).
We look for a steady state, where transitions into and out of employment
are equal. For workers, this means that δ Et = P(bt) St for all t. The
corresponding expression for ﬁrms is δ Et = bt P(bt) Mt, which is equivalent
to the workers condition since bt = St/Mt. Finally, the actual value of b in
equilibrium is determined by the free entry condition V = 0. In the appendix
we provide an existence proof for the two application case.
7 Discussion: Directed vs. Random Search
We have established that the density of posted wages is downward sloping,
and the density of accepted wages shares this feature under certain parameter
restrictions. In this section we brieﬂy argue that the directedness of the
application process is crucial for this result. An undirected version of this
model leads to an increasing, convex density of wages because of the tight
link between the proﬁt margin and the distribution of wages, as we will show.
This link is common to many directed search models.18 Directedness breaks
this link, thereby allowing for decreasing wage proﬁles.
Consider the basic model of section 2, but assume that ﬁrms cannot
publicly post their wage. They are nevertheless able to commit to a wage
when sending out the job oﬀer. This still leads to wage dispersion, since
in the last stage a higher-wage oﬀer leads to a higher chance of hiring a
worker in case he has other oﬀers as well. Such a setup has been investigated
by Gautier and Moraga-Gonz´ ales (2005). Without the ﬁrst stage, all ﬁrms
look identical and the worker’s decision becomes trivial: he simply sends his
applications randomly.19 Denote the probability that a worker gets an oﬀer
by ¯ p, and the probability that a ﬁrm has at least one applicant by ¯ q. The
18See e.g. Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Burdett and Judd (1983) and the basic version
of Acemo˘ glu and Shimer (2000). The exact speciﬁcation of this link is slightly diﬀerent
due to steady-state considerations and/or model speciﬁc details.
19The assumption of symmetric and anonymous strategies is retained. Symmetry is also
required for the ﬁrms, who randomize according to F(w), which by standard abuse of the
law of large numbers also denotes the distribution of oﬀered wages.
27proﬁts for a ﬁrm that oﬀers wage w are then given by ¯ q(1 − ψ(w))(1 − w).
For N = 2 the probability that an applicant accepts a job is given by two
components: the probability that he does not have a better oﬀer, 1 − ¯ p,
and that he as an oﬀer that is lower in case he has another oﬀer, ¯ pF(w).
Therefore, the equal proﬁt condition implies
¯ q(1 − ¯ p + ¯ pF(w))(1 − w) = Π




where Π is some constant. Note that 1−w decreases disproportionately the
higher the wage. Since all other parameters are constant, this can only be
picked up by the distribution F(w). Or phrased diﬀerently, Π
1−w is strictly
convex with a positive third derivative. Therefore the equilibrium distribu-
tion F(w) on the left hand side has to have an increasing, convex density.
This tight link between the distribution F(w) and the margin (1 − w) also
holds for higher N.20 Figure 5 shows the wage density under undirected
search for N = 15 and equal number of workers and ﬁrms, which allows a
























Figure 5: Wage densities with undirected search, for N = 15 and b = 1.
In a directed search environment a decreasing wage proﬁle is possible, be-
cause the ability to attract additional applicants breaks the link between the
distribution and the proﬁt margin. The equal proﬁt condition here implies
q(w)(1 − ψ(w))(1 − w) = Π,
20For arbitrary N ≥ 2 proﬁts are given by ¯ q(1 − ¯ p − ¯ pF(w))N−1(1 − w).
28where ψ entails the distribution F(w), but now q(w) is also responsive due
to the eﬀect of ex-ante competition. A ﬁrm is compensated for posting a
higher wage by attracting more applicants, rather than only by outbidding
the competition when the worker receives multiple oﬀers.
8 Conclusions
We develop a directed search model where workers apply simultaneously for
N jobs. We ﬁnd that an equilibrium always exists. We prove analytically
that the equilibrium is unique for N = 2 and show computational evidence
suggesting that it is unique for any N. All equilibria exhibit wage dispersion,
with ﬁrms posting N diﬀerent wages and workers sending one application to
each distinct wage. In line with stylized facts, the density of posted wages
is decreasing. The matching process is a source of ineﬃciency because the
higher paying ﬁrms enjoy higher probability of hiring a worker without un-
derlying productivity diﬀerentials. The main distinguishing feature of our
model is that dispersion is driven by the portfolio choice that workers face.
This choice problem is non-trivial only if workers can observe the oﬀered
wages; and we argue that directedness is crucial for the results.
To our knowledge, the only other directed search model where workers
can simultaneously apply for multiple jobs is Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman
(2005). Their set-up is similar to ours, except for a crucial assumption: in
their model, when two or more ﬁrms make an oﬀer to the same applicant the
potential employers engage in Bertrand competition for the worker and hence
he ends up receiving the full surplus of the match. It is not hard to see that
such an assumption negates our proof for the necessity of wage dispersion.
Indeed, in their model the unique equilibrium has all ﬁrms posting the reser-
vation value of workers, with some workers receiving their marginal product
due to Bertrand competition, regardless of the number of applications that
workers send. While we think that ex post bidding is not an unreasonable
assumption, we believe that it is useful to explore alternative formulations.
In our setting, commitment to posted wages results in dispersion in posted,
as well as received, wages. Moreover, the number of times that workers apply
aﬀects both the number of posted wages and the variation of dispersion in
the market.
We should mention that our model can be easily extended in a number
of ways. This paper shows how to incorporate entry decisions of ﬁrms and
29choices regarding the number of applications by workers, and discusses a
discrete time inﬁnite horizon setting, all of which retain the structure de-
veloped in the baseline model. Also risk aversion of workers can easily be
accommodated by replacing w with a concave function ν(w) when specifying
the worker’s utility, leaving the worker’s problem virtually unchanged and
aﬀecting the ﬁrms only through a modiﬁed constraint. Other potentially
interesting extensions include ﬁrm and worker heterogeneity. It is worth
noting that the homogeneity of ﬁrms was not used when analyzing workers’
optimization and, therefore, the results carry over in the case of productiv-
ity diﬀerentials among ﬁrms. Their optimization problems will be diﬀerent,
of course, and we conjecture that more productive ﬁrms will attract higher
applications since they place a premium on hiring. Similarly, in the case
of observable worker heterogeneity each ﬁrm posts a menu of type-speciﬁc
wages and each type of workers has its own set of utility levels and cutoﬀs.
In conclusion, we believe that this paper provides some basic structure for
further analysis.
9 Appendix
Proof of Proposition (3.2).
We show that when a single wage is posted, ﬁrms have a proﬁtable deviation.
In order to evaluate oﬀ the equilibrium path payoﬀs we perturb the game
and ﬁnd the limits of the outcomes as the perturbation vanishes. Assume an
equilibrium exists such that all ﬁrms post the same wage w∗. The expected
proﬁts are given by π(w∗) = q(w∗) (1 − w∗) (1 − ψ(w∗)), where ψ(w∗) > 0
since a worker turns down a ﬁrm with positive probability in the case of
multiple oﬀers. Suppose w∗ ∈ (0,1) and note that w∗ = ¯ w when trembles
are suﬃciently small, since each worker sends at most one application to
trembling ﬁrms. This immediately implies that in the limit ψ(w) = 0 for all
w > w∗. Since the queue length (and q(w)) is increasing in w, the proﬁts
of a ﬁrm that posts a wage just above w∗ are equal to limw&w∗ π(w) =
q(w∗) (1 − w∗) > q(w∗) (1 − w∗) (1 − ψ(w∗)) = π(w∗). Therefore oﬀering a
wage just above w∗ is a proﬁtable deviation.
If all ﬁrms post w∗ = 1 they make zero expected proﬁts. It is easy to see
that there is some ˜ w close enough to one which receives applications with
probability that is bounded away from zero for all trembles and hence there
is a proﬁtable deviation at the unperturbed game. Last, if w∗ = 0 work-
30ers receive zero expected utility and so for any positive trembles they send
both applications to positive wages. As the trembles become smaller the
hiring probability of a ﬁrm with a positive wage converges to one and since
q(0) (1 − ψ(0)) < 1 posting a wage slightly above zero increases the ﬁrm’s
proﬁts. QED
Proof of Proposition (3.3).
The proposition is proved in two stages. The problem of the high wage ﬁrms
is solved ﬁrst and that of the low wage ﬁrms follows. As shown in section 3,




−λ(w)) (1 − w) (27)
s.t. p(w) w + (1 − p(w)) u1 = u2 (28)
Using the constraint we can solve for w = (u2 − u1) λ/(1 − e−λ) + u1 and
substitute that expression into the objective function. The maximization
problem can be rewritten with respect to λ as maxλ≥¯ λ 1 − u1 − λ (u2 −
u1) − e−λ (1 − u1) where ¯ λ = λ(¯ w). This problem is strictly concave in λ
since u1 < 1 and hence it has a unique solution λ∗
2, which corresponds to
some w∗
2. Note that we proceeded as if ψ(¯ w) = 0 which is not necessarily the
case. However, if w∗
2 > ¯ w then the value of ψ(¯ w) is irrelevant; if w∗
2 = ¯ w then
proposition (3.2) shows that low wage ﬁrms cannot post ¯ w in equilibrium and
hence ψ(¯ w) = 0. Therefore the maximization problem is speciﬁed correctly.
There are two candidate solutions for w∗
2. If the constraint does not bind,
the wage is determined by the ﬁrst order conditions of the problem, ˆ w2. If
the constraint does bind then w∗
2 = ¯ w. We show that high wage ﬁrms enjoy
strictly higher proﬁts than low wage ﬁrms when w∗
2 = ˆ w2. Setting the deriv-
ative of the problem to zero yields u2 −u1 = e−λ∗
2 (1−u1). Substituting this
expression back into the proﬁt function and rearranging gives the following:
π(ˆ w2) = (1 − e
−λ∗






The proﬁts of a low wage ﬁrm that posts w1 and has expected queue length
λ1 = λ(w1) are given by
π(w1) = (1 − e






31where the ﬁrst term is the probability of getting at least one applicant, the
second term is the margin of the ﬁrm, and the last term is the probability
that the chosen applicant does not have an oﬀer from a high wage ﬁrm.
Comparing the two equations term by term it is easy to see that the proﬁts
of high wage ﬁrms are strictly higher: ﬁrms oﬀering a higher wage have longer
queues, so λ∗
2 > λ1 which means that 1 − e−λ∗
2 > 1 − e−λ1; u1 = p(w1) w1
which implies that u1 ≤ w1; to prove the the third term we need to show
that λ e−λ/(1 − e−λ) < (1 − e−λ)/λ for any λ > 0. This expression can be
rearranged as λ2 e−λ < (1 − e−λ)2 or λ2 eλ − e2 λ + 2 eλ − 1 < 0. Denote
the left hand side by H1(λ) and note that H1(0) = 0. If H0
1(λ) < 0 for
all λ > 0 we have our result. But, H0
1(λ) = (2 λ + λ2 + 2 − 2 eλ) eλ and
H0
1(0) = 0. Call the term in the bracket H2(λ) and note that H2(0) = 0.
Then H0
2(λ) = 2 (1+λ−eλ) which is negative for λ > 0. Therefore, w∗
2 = ¯ w
is a necessary condition for any equilibrium.
Turning to low wage ﬁrms, they solve
max
w (1 − e
−λ(w)) (1 − ψ(w)) (1 − w) (31)
s.t. p(w) w = u1 (32)
As argued above, ψ(w) = p(w∗
2) for w ∈ [0, ¯ w) ∩ W, i.e. for all wage levels
that are actually posted. We solve the maximization problem as if ψ(w)
is the same for all w, whether posted or not, which is the case when, for
instance, workers randomize independently inside each of the two intervals.
We then show that this simpliﬁcation is innocuous. Using equation (32), we
can solve for w = u1 λ/(1 − e−λ) and substitute it into the proﬁt function
to get maxλ (1 − e−λ − λ u1) (1 − p(w∗
2)). The term in the second bracket
has no marginal eﬀect so the problem is strictly concave and therefore it has
a unique solution λ∗







We now consider the case where the worker strategies are such that ψ(w)
takes diﬀerent values in [0, ¯ w). An example of why this could happen is the
following. Suppose that one of the pairs of wages that the workers randomize
over in response to every perturbed distribution is (˜ w1, ˜ w2) where ˜ w2 ≈ 1. If
workers applying to ˜ w1 send their high wage application to ˜ w2 only, then the
retention probability at ˜ w1 is very high since ˜ w2 being close to one implies
that p(˜ w2) has to be very low. As the trembles become smaller, the prob-
ability that this particular pair is chosen converges to zero, however ψ(˜ w1)
remains equal to p(˜ w2) and so it converges to a relatively high value. This
32would be troublesome if a diﬀerent equilibrium could be supported in the
way described. Suppose that there is such an equilibrium in which low wage
ﬁrms post some ˜ w 6= ˆ w1. For ˜ w to be posted it needs to provide the highest
possible proﬁts, implying in particular that π(˜ w) ≥ π(ˆ w1). The last inequal-
ity can only hold if ψ(ˆ w1) > ψ(˜ w) since { ˆ w1} = argmax(1 − e−λ(w)) (1 − w).
However, the fact that ˜ w is actually posted means that ψ(˜ w) = p(w∗
2). More-
over, w∗
2 = ¯ w implies that p(w) ≤ p(w∗
2) for all wages w that high ﬁrms can
post and hence ψ(˜ w) = p(w∗
2) ≥ ψ(ˆ w1), yielding a contradiction. Therefore
no other equilibrium can be supported.
This completes the proof of proposition (3.3). QED
Proof of Proposition (4.2).
To generalize (3.3) to any N it is suﬃcient to show that unless type i ≥ 2
ﬁrms post ¯ wi−1 they make strictly higher proﬁts than ﬁrms of type i − 1.
After using the constraint to solve for the wage, and taking the ﬁrst order
conditions, the proﬁts of a type i ﬁrm are
π(ˆ wi) = (1 − e
−λ∗





i ) (1 − ψi) (33)
The proﬁts of a type i − 1 ﬁrm are given by
π(wi−1) = (1 − e





) (1 − ψi) (34)
and they are lower for the same reasons as before. QED
Proof of Propositions (3.4) and (4.3).
We show that there is a sequence {di}N
i=1 such that when w∗
i is posted by di
ﬁrms (call these type i ﬁrms), there is no proﬁtable deviation for any type of
ﬁrm. Afterwards, uniqueness is proven for the N = 2 case.
First, consider deviations within the same type. Since w∗
1 = ˆ w1 it is
immediate that type 1 ﬁrms cannot proﬁtably deviate within their type. For
type i ≥ 2 ﬁrms, w∗
i = ¯ wi−1 is a necessary condition for equilibrium. ¯ wi−1 is
the proﬁt maximizing wage within type i only if ¯ wi−1 > ˆ wi, i.e. when then
wage derived from the ﬁrst order condition is not feasible. We show that
proﬁts can be equalized across types only if the above condition holds. The
previous proposition proved that if type i ﬁrms post ˆ wi then they necessarily
make higher proﬁts than type i − 1 ﬁrms, or π(ˆ wi) > π(w∗
i−1). If ¯ wi−1 < ˆ wi,
33and if all type i ﬁrms post ¯ wi−1 they make higher proﬁts than if they all posted
ˆ wi. This happens because they receive the same number of applications (one
per worker) but pay them less (however, each ﬁrm could individually increase
its proﬁts even more by posting ˆ wi). As a result, π(¯ wi−1) > π(ˆ wi) and proﬁts
cannot be equalized across types i and i−1. If, on the other hand, ¯ wi−1 > ˆ wi,
then π(¯ wi−1) < π(ˆ wi). Therefore, if proﬁts can be equalized across types,
then ¯ wi−1 is the proﬁt maximizing wage of type i ﬁrms.
The next step is to prove that proﬁts can be equalized across types of
ﬁrms. To simplify notation let πi = π(w∗
i), pi = p(w∗
i), ˜ πi = πi/(1 − ψi),
and λ∗
i = b/di. For equal proﬁts across types it is suﬃcient to show that
πi = πi−1 for all i, which is the same as ˜ πi = (1 − pi) ˜ πi−1 since the term
(1 − ψi) is common to both sides. We show that given a di−1 we can ﬁnd a
di in (0,di−1) such that ∆πi(di|di−1) ≡ ˜ πi−1 − ˜ πi/(1−pi) = 0. This allows us
to construct a sequence of dis such that all ﬁrms make the same proﬁts for
an arbitrary initial d1. We then show that the di’s sum up to one.
It is useful to recall the following two equations (for i ≥ 2).
ui−1 = pi−1 w
∗
i−1 + (1 − pi−1) ui−2 (35)
ui−1 = pi w
∗
i + (1 − pi) ui−2 (36)
Equation (35) holds by the deﬁnition of ui−1. Equation (36) holds because
w∗
i = ¯ wi−1 and hence the i ﬁrm has to provide the same utility as w∗
i−1 if it
is used for the i − 1 lowest application.
Note that the queue lengths are the same when di = di−1, which means
that pi−1 = pi, w∗
i−1 = w∗
i, and ˜ πi−1 = ˜ πi leading to ∆πi(di−1;di−1) < 0. On
the other hand, λi ≈ ∞ when di ≈ 0 which means that pi ≈ 0 and therefore
equation (36) requires a very large w∗
i leading to ˜ πi < 0 (this occurs because
the ﬁrm is assumed to post ¯ wi−1). ∆πi(di|di−1) > 0 when di ≈ 0, and there is
a di(di−1) such that type i and i−1 ﬁrms make the same proﬁts. Moreover,












When di increases the queue length decreases and hence the probability of
getting a job increases. Therefore the ﬁrst partial is positive and the ﬁrst
term as a whole is strictly negative. The second partial is non-positive since
∂˜ πi/∂λi ≤ 0. Recall that when i = 1 the ﬁrst order conditions are equal to
zero because w∗
1 = ˆ w1. Furthermore, when i ≥ 2 the ﬁrm would like to post
34a lower wage when proﬁts are equalized (i.e., w∗
i = ¯ wi−1 > ˆ wi) which implies
that the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to λ are strictly negative. This
proves that equation (37) is strictly negative.
Therefore, for a given d1 the rest of the sequence d2(d1),d3(d1)...dN(d1)
can be uniquely constructed such that all types of ﬁrms make the same
proﬁts. To ﬁnd the sequence whose elements sum up to one deﬁne S(d1) ≡ PN
i=1 di(d1) and note that it is continuous since all of its components vary
continuously with d1. Moreover, S(1/N) < 1 since di(di−1) < di−1 and
S(1) > 1 so there is some d∗
1 such that S(d∗
1) = 1 and an equilibrium exists
for any N.
To prove the uniqueness of equilibrium when N = 2 we show that d1 and
d2(d1) are positively related along the isoproﬁt curve, and hence there is a
unique pair that sums up to one. Implicit diﬀerentiation of d2 with respect to
d1 while keeping proﬁts equal yields ∂d2/∂d1 = −(∂∆π2/∂d1)/(∂∆π2/∂d2).
The denominator is positive by (37). A little algebra shows that the numer-




2/(1 − p2)), which is
positive since the queue length is inversely related to the number of ﬁrms
and λ∗
1 < λ∗
2. This proves that the equilibrium is unique when N = 2. QED
Proof of Proposition (5.1).
The planner solves the following problem: maxd∈[0,1] m(d) = p1 +p2 −p1 p2.
If the problem has an interior solution, the ﬁrst order conditions yield
∂p2
∂d1
(1 − p1) +
∂p1
∂d1
(1 − p2) = 0 (38)
Recalling that λ1 = b/(1 − d) and λ2 = b/d it is easy to see that ∂pi/∂d =
−∂λi/∂d (1 − eλi − λi e−λi)/λ2
i, ∂λ1/∂d = b/(1 − d)2 = λ2
1/b, and ∂λ2/∂d =
−b/d2 = −λ2












It is immediate that one extremum occurs when λ1 = λ2, or d = 1/2. The
second derivative is given by
∂2m
∂d2 = 1




b2(1 − e−λ2 − λ2e−λ2)(1 − e−λ1 − λ1e−λ1) − 1
b2λ3
1e−λ1(1 − p2).(40)
35Substitution of (39) and dividing by (1 − p1)(1 − p2)/b2 establishes that at
any candidate extreme point the sign of the second derivative is given by
sign(∂2m/∂d2) = sign(f(λ2) + f(λ1)), where
f(λ) =
(1 − e−λ − λe−λ)2
(1 − (1 − eλ)/λ)2 −
λ3e−λ
1 − (1 − eλ)/λ
. (41)
Therefore, we want to show that there is no b > 0 such that there exists







) ≤ 0. (42)
Figure 6 shows f(λ) for λ ≥ 0. The function is strictly decreasing on
(0,a1), strictly increasing on (a1,a4), again strictly decreasing on (a4,∞)
and converges to 1 for λ → ∞. The only roots of the function are 0 and
a2. We will discuss this function in order to establish the result. Note that
for any b, the speciﬁc value of d deﬁnes λ1 = b/d and λ2 = b/(1 − d).
Note that for λ2 > a3 it is not possible to fulﬁll (42), where a3 is such that
f(a3) = −f(a1). Therefore we will restrict the discussion to λ2 < a3. This
also implies that we do not have to discuss any b where 2b > a3. For d = 1/2













2468 1 0 1 2 1 4 x
f(x)
a1 a2 a3 a4
f(a1)
-f(a1)
Figure 6: f(x) for x ≥ 0.
CASE 1: b ≥ a2/2. Then at d = 1/2 we have 2f(2b) ≥ 0. Starting from
d = 1/2, i.e. λ1 = λ2, we will increase d and thus spread λ1 and λ2 apart.
36We will show that there does not exist d > 1/2 such that (42) holds. Assume
that (42) holds for the given b at some d > 1/2. Then for any b0 ∈ [a2/2,b)
there exists a d0 > 1/2 such that (42) holds. This is easy to see if there
exists d0 > 1/2 such that λ1 = b/d = b0/d0 = λ0
1. Then f(λ1) = f(λ0
1). Since
λ2 = b/1−d) > b0/(1−d0) = λ0
2, f(λ2) > f(λ0
2). But then f(λ1)+f(λ2) ≤ 0
implies f(λ0
1) + f(λ0
2) < 0. If for some b0 ∈ [a2/2,b) no such d0 > 1/2 exists,
we reach a contradiction: There is some b00 ∈ [b0,b) such that at d00 = 1/2 it
holds that λ1 = b/d = b00/d00 = λ0
1. By the prior argument f(λ00
1)+f(λ00
2) < 0,
but this violates 2f(2b) = f(λ00
1) + f(λ00
2) ≥ 0. Therefore, if we know that
(42) does not hold at ˜ b = a2/2, then we know that (42) does not hold for
any b > a2/2. Figure 7 shows f(a2/2d) + f(a2/(2(1 − d))) for all d ≥ 1/2,
which is strictly positive for all d > 1/2. Therefore, (42) does not hold for






0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 d
f(a2/d)+f(a2/(1-d))
Figure 7: f(a2
2d) + f( a2
2(1−d)) for d ∈ [0,1].
CASE 2: b < a2/2. In this case we have at d = 1/2 that 2f(2b) < 0,
i.e. we are in a local maximum. If there exist any other local maxima at
d > 1/2, there has to be some d0 ∈ (1/2,d) that constitutes a local minimum.
Therefore, if for some d conditions (42) and (39) hold simultaneously, then
there exists 1/2 < d0 < d such that f(b/d0)+f(b/1−d0) > 0. At d0 it has to
hold λ0
2 = b/(1−d0) > a2, otherwise f(λ0
1)+f(λ0
2) > 0 would not be possible.
We also know that λ0
1 < b/2 < a2. Since d0 < d, we know that λ1 < λ0
1 and
λ0
2 < λ2. Now consider a d0 at which f(λ0
1) + f(λ0
2) > 0. If we increase d to


































Figure 8: f0(x)x2 for x ∈ [0,a2].
If the term in square brackets is positive, then f(λ1) + f(λ2) is increasing
as we increase d further. So if we can show that the part in the square
brackets is positive for all (λ1,λ2) ∈ [0,a2] × [a2,a3], then it is not pos-
sible to increase d starting from any d0 and achieve a negative value of
f(λ1) + f(λ2) (which we would need to arrive at another maximum). Since
max[0,a2]f0(λ)λ2 ≤ min[a2,a3]f0(λ)λ2, as can be seen in ﬁgure 8, it is not possi-
ble to have another local maximum in the interior apart from d = 1/2. QED
Lemma 9.1 Fix the number N of applications. If πb is equilibrium proﬁt
under parameter b and πb0 equilibrium proﬁt under parameter b0, then for
any π between πb and πb0 there exists a parameter b00 between b and b0 such
that π is equilibrium proﬁt under b00.
Proof: The proof relies heavily on the construction of existence for propo-
sition (4.3). Denote by ˜ D(b) a sequence {di}N
i=1 such that proﬁts as con-
structed in the existence proof are equalized, where
PN
i=1 di need not equal
38unity (D(b) ⊆ ˜ D(b) requires additionally
PN
i=1 di = 1). πb is associated
with an equilibrium sequence {di}N
i=1 ∈ D(b). Since all interactions only
rely on the ratio of workers to ﬁrms, {b0
b di}N
i=1 ∈ ˜ D(b0) and proﬁts remain un-
changed. Now we can vary the fraction of lowest wage ﬁrms under parameter
b0. This changes the sequence of ﬁrms and the associated wages continuously,
and therefore proﬁts vary continuously. Therefore, there exists a sequence
{ˇ di}N
i=1 ∈ ˜ D(b) such that the proﬁts as calculated in the existence proof un-
der parameter b are π. Now consider sequence { 1
Sb0( ˇ d1)
ˇ di}N
i=1 ∈ D(b00), where
b00 = b0/Sb0( ˇ d1) and Sb0( ˇ d1) =
PN




add to one, we have found an equilibrium under b00. By construction the
proﬁt in this equilibrium is π. Q.E.D.
Proposition 9.1 Given K ∈ (0,1), N = 2, β ∈ (0,1) and δ ∈ (0,1), there
exists a stationary equilibrium of the dynamic labor market interaction.
Proof: Normalize the measure of workers to 1. Take a measure M of
vacant ﬁrms, a measure S of searching workers, and a beneﬁt L from optimal
search as given. We will construct a new M0, S0 and L0 using the property
that the equilibrium considerations in the dynamic game are similar to the
one-shot interaction.
Consider the one-shot interaction where workers have outside option u0 =
β(1 − β)(1 − δ)L and ﬁrms face normalized costs of vacancy creation of
Knorm = K(1 − β(1 − δ)), where the costs are normalized because in the
associated dynamic game ﬁrms have several periods to recover their costs.
Assume Knorm < 1, otherwise there is trivially a stationary equilibrium in
which ﬁrms never enter and all workers are unemployed. For given S, we can
ﬁnd the unique free-entry equilibrium of the one-shot model. Let M0 be the
number of ﬁrms in this equilibrium. Moreover, the equilibrium deﬁnes the
wages w∗
i and the probabilities pi attached to obtaining these wages uniquely.
Assume that workers would search over these wage-probabilities repeatedly
(by applying to each wage in every period and accepting the best oﬀer), and
let L0 be the present value of doing so in the repeated game. Finally, we have
to take into account the steady-state condition on S. Deﬁne the new S0 by
the steady-state equation δ(1 − S0) = (1 −
QN
i=1(1 − pi))S0 where the pi are
the probabilities in the one-shot equilibrium. Since the equilibrium values
depend continuously on S and u0 which is continuous in L, the new values
S0, M0 and L0 also depend continuously on S, M and L.
39Therefore, we have constructed a function that continuously maps S, M
and L into the new M0, S0 and L0. Moreover, the construction was done in
a way that incorporates all the strategic interactions. Therefore, if we ﬁnd
a ﬁxed point of the function, we have found a stationary equilibrium. Note
that S ≤ 1, since there is only a measure one of workers. Moreover, M ≤ M
for some M ∈ <, since ﬁrms would not be able to recoup their costs if their
number is too large, given that the number of workers is bounded. Since
for M=0 or S=0 the one-shot game is ill deﬁned, we have to bound both
domains away from zero. Let S ∈ [S,1] and M ∈ [M,M] for S and M
small. We know that for S ∈ (0,1] the ratio b = S/M0 is bounded away
from zero for given Knorm as otherwise ﬁrms could not recover their costs;
and this implies that the pi are bounded away from 1. By the deﬁnition of
S0, small S are therefore mapped into larger S0. We can thus bound the
domain for S away from zero and still be sure that the mapping does not
choose an S0 smaller than the lower bound. Let M be the number of entrants
M0 when there are S workers. For more workers, there will be more ﬁrms
entering. Finally, let L0 ∈ [0, 1
1−β], since the worker can never do better than
getting a wage 1 in every period. Therefore, domain and co-domain for the
function are identical and compact, and by Brouwer’s ﬁxed point theorem a
ﬁxed point exists. Q.E.D.
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